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"Waterlocked": Public Access to
New Jersey's Coastline
Timothy M Mulvanej and Brian Weeks~
"The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested.. than it can abdicate its police
powers ....
"The proprietors were men who understood their rights, and were
fearless in the defence of them. If those who twice purchased New
Jersey; who braved the dangers of an immense ocean; shared in the
toils, sufferings, and privations of the first settlers; who claimed all
strays by land, and wrecks by sea, in virtue of their grants, and never
for a moment conceived that these grants swallowed up what, by the
law of the land they left, had ever been considered the common rights
of Englishmen; shall we, after a lapse of almost three centuries, insult
the memory of men who were an ornament to the human race, whose
virtues have highly exalted their names, and whose labours have been
a blessing to the world, by saying, they knew nothing of their
privileges, and that their birthrights were lost forever in the forests of
New Jersey; that their boasted Magna Charta was a farce from which
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they could derive no benefit; and that liberty, which they so highly
valued, was confined to the grants and concessions? or that our
legislatures, from time to time taking upon them to regulate fisheries
of oysters as well as of floating fish for the public benefit, were totally
ignorant of their powers, overstepped the bounds prescribed by the
constitution, to the destruction of the rights and interests of
individuals? I think not. "2
"That generations of trustees have slept on public rights does not
foreclose their successors from awakening."3
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the public trust doctrine as applicable to
waterways and their shores, with a particular focus on emerging trends in
the state of New Jersey. Several disparate factors have aggravated
disputes between competing visions for waterfront areas. The U.S.
population has increased much more in coastal than inland areas. The
decline in heavy industry along with dramatic increases in real estate
values have led to intensive development and redevelopment in
waterfront areas, including the re-opening of areas functionally closed to
the public for well over one hundred years. As communities have
discovered the values of attractive waterfront areas, conflicts have arisen
as to who will share in the benefits. Will waterfronts become a public
asset, a hybrid of a grand promenade and linear park for access and




Since New Jersey is the most densely populated and developed
coastal state, its shoreline has been a battleground for competing public
and private demands for access and use. Every one of New Jersey's 8.5
million residents lives within sixty miles of the Atlantic Ocean or one of
its bays or estuaries. Therefore, New Jersey provides ample fodder for
the exploration of the changing contours of the public trust doctrine as
applied to waterways and their shores, particularly in light of its very high
real estate values and long, flat shoreline vulnerable to storm damage.
Part I of this Article discusses a brief history of the public trust
doctrine, while Part II defines the role of this common law doctrine in
New Jersey. Part III details the scope of public access to and use of the
Atlantic Ocean and the adjacent dry sand beaches in New Jersey. Part III
also examines the doctrine in the context of regulatory takings
jurisprudence, confronts recent criticisms of New Jersey court decisions
that expand public rights to the state's beaches, and comments on the
utility of other common law principles to further broaden these rights.
Part IV briefly summarizes contemporary public trust issues relating to
waterways in other coastal states. Finally, Part V identifies several
alternative methods that New Jersey has recently used to uphold the
public trust doctrine and anticipates issues that the judicial system could
soon face regarding the public trust doctrine as applied to New Jersey's
coastline.
I. A HISTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is an ancient legal principle emanating from
Roman law, which recognized that:
By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No
one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that
he respects habitations, monuments, and the buildings, which are not,
like the sea, subject only to the law of nations.4
Among the rights of the people recognized by Roman and English law
were the rights of navigation and fishery. Some form of the public trust
doctrine is recognized by the law in most nations:
Historically, no developed western civilization has recognized
absolute rights of private ownership... [of land between high and low
water marks] as a means of allocating this scarce and precious
resource among the competing public demands. Though private
ownership was permitted in the Dark Ages, neither Roman Law nor
4. INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 90 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., Longmans, Green & Co.
1905).
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the English common law as it developed after the signing of the
Magna Charta would permit it.5
The doctrine came to the United States by way of English law. It is a
common law doctrine that generally recognizes that the public has
particular inalienable rights to certain natural resources.6 As common
law, the doctrine remains subject to molding and extension by court
decisions.7 Accordingly, the specific rights recognized under the public
trust doctrine continue to evolve over time.
Under English law, the King had limited rights to convey property.
Certain rights remained the permanent property of the realm and were
held by the Crown in its regal capacity in trust for all subjects. The rights
held by the Crown included the rights of navigation and fishery in the sea
and other tidal waterways, which English courts construed as including
5. United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in Boston, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass.
1981) (internal citation omitted).
6. See Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254, 1269 (D.N.J. 1982);
PUTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 1 (David Slade ed., 2d ed. 1997) (defining
public trust doctrine); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Discussion of the public trust
doctrine involves the use of several common terms that have specific meanings that might be
different from traditional definitions. The classification of waters as "navigable" varies by
context under both federal and state law. Factors that can influence the meaning of the term
include the scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction, the scope of Federal Commerce Clause
authority, the application of the navigational servitude exception to unconstitutional takings or
public right of passage under state law, and colonial, state, or federal riparian grants. The U.S.
Supreme Court has cautioned that "any reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated
upon careful appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked in a
particular case." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171 (1979) (emphasis removed);
see also John A. Humbach, Comment, Public Rights in the Navigable Streams of New York, 6
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 461 (1989). Tidal waterways are those bodies where the tide affects the
height or flow of the water. The point at which the water simply flows at all times in one
direction toward the sea is the head of tide. The legal significance of this distinction is
demonstrated in Fulton Light. Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (N.Y. 1911).
Tidal waterways are known as navigable in law. Id Tideland is land that is flowed by the normal
daily ebb and flow of the tide, from the ordinary low tide up to the ordinary high tide. See
PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra, at xv. Casual observers may refer to
this area as the "foreshore" or wet sand beach. The dry sand beach is that area of land above, or
landward, of the ordinary tide line, and seaward of the vegetation line, id. at xiv, the first non-
elevated manmade structure generally parallel to the ocean, inlet or bay, or the toe of the first
dune. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7E-3.22(a) (2007). "Littoral" refers to land that now is or formerly
was flowed by the tide, while "riparian" also refers to land flowed by a river. Glass v. Goeckel,
703 N.W.2d 58, 61 n.1 (Mich. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1340 (2006); PUTTING THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra, at xiv, xv. These terms are often used
interchangeably.Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella, 222 A.2d 138, 142 (N.J. Super.Ct.
Ch. Div 1966); PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra, at xiv. The high water
mark is the "line formed by the intersection of the tidal plane of mean high tide with the shore."
O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't of N.J., 235 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1967). The mean or ordinary high tide
is a mean of all high tides over a period of 18.6 years. Id. at 9-10 (detailing formula for
determining mean high water line); see also Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S.
10, 26-27 (1935).
7. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355,365 (N.J. 1984).
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the rights to land one's boat with its catch, to empty and dry the nets, and
to bring the fish from the shore to the nearest road to market.8 The King
had no power to convey those rights and any attempt to do so would have
been an invalid usurpation of the rights of a free people and their
Parliament. Accordingly, when the King conveyed private ownership of
the land now known as New Jersey, he did not convey those inalienable
rights.9
The American Revolution resulted in the conveyance of royal rights
to the legislature of each state to be held in trust for its people."0 At least
since 1821, case law in the United States has recognized rights of the
public under the public trust doctrine.11 American law views navigable
waters as similar to highways: their shores are open to all and impressed
with public rights related to navigation and fishing. The U.S. Supreme
Court held: "[i]t is, indeed, the susceptibility to use as highways of
commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over
navigation upon [navigable waterways]."' 2
Today, the nature of the protected resources and the scope of the
public rights are defined by and subject to the property laws of each state.
In general, tidelands are owned by the state and those lands seaward of
the mean high water line are impressed with a public trust for the benefit
of all. 3 Public ownership in tidal waterways generally extends up to the
mean high or low water lines. 4 A few states, including Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia, are "low water" states,
with public ownership of the submerged lands lying seaward of the mean
8. See Stevens v. Paterson & Newark R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 539 (1870) (explaining
traditional understanding of public use of shoreline). An 1830 treatise states:
So the shore lies between the fishery or navigation and the public, but the public have
a right to the fishery and navigation, and a convenient way is presumed over the shore
for carrying them on; such as for launching boats, carriage and footway for the
conveyance of the fish, goods, &c. to and from the boats, &c. and for exercising
whatever other conveniences common sense and usage point out as essential to these
rights; in short, whatever obstruction would render the fishery or navigation nugatory,
must be deemed unlawful and incompatible with those rights.
R. Hall, An Essay on the Rights of the Crown in the Sea-Shores of the Realm, etc. (a) of the
King's Title to the British Seas (b), reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE AND LAW RELATING THERETO 667, 847-48 (London, Stevens & Haynes, 3d ed.
1888).
9. See Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 412 (1842); Bell v. Gough, 23
N.J.L. 624, 684 (1852); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 11-13 (1821) (summarizing original
conveyance of East and West Jersey, later to become known as "New Jersey").
10. Martin, 41 U.S. at 410; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 36 (1894).
11. See I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Martin, 41 U.S. at 411-12;
Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 3.
12. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1981); see also PUTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra note 6, at 5.
13. Shively, 152 U.S. at 9.
14. For a discussion of these terms in the context of the public trust doctrine, see supra
note 6.
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low water line.15 Nevertheless, "even in some of these States ... public
rights to use the tidelands for the purposes of fishing, hunting, bathing,
etc., have long been recognized."'1 6 Most states, including New Jersey, are
"high water" states that recognize state ownership in tidal waterways, the
underlying submerged lands, and the shore waterward of the mean high
water line. 7 In some states, notably New Jersey and Oregon, the public
also has rights to the shoreline above the high water line. 8 The next Part
discusses the public trust doctrine in the context of New Jersey's densely
populated and highly developed coastline.
11. NEW JERSEY'S COASTLINE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
In New Jersey, the public trust doctrine recognizes public rights to a
variety of natural resources, including access to and use of the ocean and
other tidal waterways and shores. The New Jersey courts recognize that
the public trust doctrine is an intrinsic element of property rights and
law.'9 While some property rights advocates have suggested that the
courts have unfairly imposed the public trust doctrine upon the absolute
and unrestricted rights of private property owners, the history of the
public trust doctrine and its case law leads to a contrary conclusion: the
public trust doctrine is inherent in the chain of title to all properties that
border tidal waterways in New Jersey and protects natural resources
throughout the state.2" Thus, no owner of property in New Jersey can
reasonably expect to exclude the public absolutely from any tidal
waterway or its shore.
15. James M. Kehoe, Note, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as
Trustees of Public Trust Properties, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 (1995); see also Shively,
152 U.S. at 18-25; PUrTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra note 6; Jose L.
Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Colonial
Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 623, 628, 630 (1998) (addressing Massachusetts colonial ordinance
extending private property seaward to mean low water line).
16. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 n. 12 (1988).
17. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47. 53 (N.J.
1972) (categorizing New Jersey as a mean high water state); State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 462
P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
18. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984); State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678-79 (Or. 1969) (Denecke, J. concurring).
19. See, e.g., Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624, 681 (1852); Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569
A.2d 312, 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) ("The public trust doctrine has always been
recognized in New Jersey and is deeply engrained in our common law.").
20. See PUrING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINETO WORK, supra note 6, at 1.
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A. Chain of Title to New Jersey's Coastline
A basic tenet of real property law is that one may not convey greater
title than one has.2' Accordingly, understanding the effect of the public
trust doctrine on real property rights in New Jersey, as in any other state,
requires analyzing the chain of title to real property before addressing the
responsibilities of a trustee of that property.
New Jersey was established in 1664 as a proprietary colony, i.e., a
real estate investment company, with a grant of property from King
Charles II to his brother James, the Duke of York."2 The Duke of York
then conveyed those rights to the proprietors Lord John Berkeley and Sir
George Carteret.23 After the Restoration in 1702, the proprietors
surrendered all their rights of government to Queen Anne. Berkeley and
Carteret retained their property rights, which they divided in 1676 into
East and West Jersey. These grants form the basis of all land titles in New
Jersey.24
Title to all property in New Jersey is based on, and can be traced
back to, these original conveyances from King Charles 11.25 Since the King
could not convey the inalienable rights that he held in trust for the public,
those rights were not conveyed to Berkeley and Carteret, but rather were
retained by the Crown. Accordingly, no property owner in New Jersey
other than the reigning monarch of England and the state has ever
possessed any of the inalienable rights protected under the public trust
doctrine.
B. The State of New Jersey as Trustee
The public trust doctrine involves elements of real property and trust
law; the role of the state in safeguarding public rights in natural resources
is that of trustee.2 6 The state may convey submerged lands or tidal shores
to private owners, but the private ownership remains perpetually subject
21. See Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 7 A. 418, 421 (N.J. 1886) (explaining that holder of
property has only that title conveyed to him by the vendor, unless he has gained greater title by
operation of law).
22. See Graham v. Twp. of Edison, 173 A.2d 403, 405 (N.J. 1961).
23. Id.; Grant of Land from James, Duke of York, to John Lord Berkeley, Baron of
Straton & Sir George Carteret (June 24, 1664), available at http://www.state.nj.us/
njfacts/njdoc6.htm (last visited May 23, 2007).
24. Two real estate holding companies, the General Board of Proprietors of the Eastern
Division of New Jersey and the General Board of Proprietors of the Western Division of New
Jersey, controlled all residual property interests within New Jersey into the late twentieth
century.
25. Graham, 173 A.2d at 405.
26. See Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. 1981);
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972); Slocum v.
Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312, 316, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (describing duties of
trustee to include loyalty, care and full disclosure).
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to public rights of access and use.27 The state may not convey, waive, or
otherwise extinguish rights protected under the public trust doctrine. 8
Any attempt by the state to do so is void ab initio. Under principles of
trust law, the state's fiduciary obligation to safeguard the corpus of the
trust and its benefits for the public is a strict one. Should the trustee fail
to execute faithfully his or her duties, the beneficiaries of the trust may
have the right to bring an action for an accounting to recoup the assets of
the trust for their benefit.29
Since the 1970s, the need for a diligent trustee has grown. Disputes
regarding the extent of public access to and use of the Atlantic Ocean,
tributary waterways, and their adjacent beaches and shores have grown
increasingly discordant as New Jersey's coastal population and
development have expanded. In addition, increased participation in
active outdoor recreational sports has increased demand for use of both
tidal and inland navigational waters.3" The next Part describes how the
scope of these public trust rights continues to evolve via New Jersey case
law and statutory and regulatory enactments.
Ill. THE CURRENT STATE: PUBLIC RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO
AND USE OF TIDAL SHORES IN NEW JERSEY
The seminal public trust doctrine case in the United States arose
from a dispute in New Jersey over just a few bushels of oysters.3 Though
that case was published in 1821, public trust doctrine case law in New
Jersey remained relatively quiet from the second half of the nineteenth
century through the first half of the twentieth century. During that time,
urban waterfronts were densely developed with largely industrial uses,
while several oceanfront cities with sandy beaches and railroad access-
such as Asbury Park, Long Branch, Atlantic City, and Cape May City-
grew into popular resorts. Outside of these urban areas and resorts, the
27. See Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders of the U.S. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d
354, 358-59 (D.N.J. 1999); Lusardi, 430 A.2d at 886 (holding any conveyance by state of tidally
flowed property is subject to permanent public rights of access); Hyland v. Borough of
Allenhurst, 393 A.2d 579, 582 (N.J. 1978).
28. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Neptune City, 294 A.2d at
54; Karam v. State Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 705 A.2d 1221, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(stating that although states have inherent authority to convey riparian grants to private persons,
the "sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use of public trust property"), affl'd, 723
A.2d 943 (N.J. 1999).
29. See Slocum, 569 A.2d at 316-17 ("A public trustee is endowed with the same duties and
obligations as an ordinary trustee."); Lusardi, 430 A.2d at 886; Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54.
30. See William Arthur Atkins, Recreation, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Po-Re/Recreation.html (last visited May 23, 2007)
(forecasting future trends of water-based activities).
31. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 9-12 (1821) (finding oysters planted on submerged
land were not property of adjacent upland owner, but could be freely harvested by public);
BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND ECOLOGY
IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY (1998).
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New Jersey beaches were largely undeveloped and used only for fishing,
fowling, and associated activities.32
The New Jersey coastline changed rapidly after World War II due to
the popularity of the automobile. Prosperity among the working classes
and new suburban neighborhoods allowed for improvements to New
Jersey's highways. These changes included road tunnels connecting to
New York City in the late 1920s and the Garden State Parkway in the
early 1950s. Suddenly, the entire 128 miles of white sand beach,
affectionately known by the tourist community as the "Jersey Shore,"
came within reach of the general public.
The decline in heavy industries in the 1970s dramatically changed the
urban waterfronts of New Jersey. Areas that were formerly factories,
docks, oil tank farms, and railroad yards were abandoned and then
redeveloped as desirable waterfront properties, many with magnificent
views of New York City. The increased popularity of the attractive new
urban waterfronts and the Jersey Shore created new conflicts as
nonresidents sought to use the shoreline.
A. Modern New Jersey Public Trust Doctrine Case Law
Starting in the 1970s, the courts slowly addressed disputes between
private property owners and the beach-going public, and often decided
them under the public trust doctrine. In each of those disputes, the New
Jersey courts found in favor of the public right.
The state supreme court recognized that the public trust doctrine
extends to access to and use of publicly owned dry sand beach above the
mean high water line,33 where a municipal ordinance prohibiting use of a
privately owned oceanfront lot for recreation violated both the state
Municipal Land Use Law34 and state policies based on the public trust
doctrine. 5 The courts have also held that a municipality may not restrict
use of a portion of its beach to its residents only,36 nor may it discriminate
against nonresidents in its charges or other beach access or use policies.
With respect to discriminating as to residency, the courts have held that
municipalities may not constructively restrict nonresident use. For
example, where a municipality maintained toilet facilities adjacent to a
public beach, the municipality abused its power by barring beachgoers
32. For a list of modern New Jersey beach resorts, see New Jersey Tourism, The Jersey
Shore, http://www.State.nj.us/travel/ersey-shoreshtwn.html (last visited May 23, 2007).
33. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J.
1972); see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) and
discussion thereof at infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (2006).
35. See Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881, 886-88 (N.J. 1981).
36. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1978).
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from use of that basic accommodation.37 In another instance, a trial court
found that a municipality breached its fiduciary duties to the public by
raising beach admittance fees rather than property taxes to generate
revenue solely to benefit its residents and by charging fees that were
"disproportionately and inequitably" higher on weekends, when mostly
nonresidents use the beaches, as opposed to lower fees on weekdays
when mostly residents use the beaches.38
New Jersey courts also recognize that, since the public trust doctrine
is a common law principle, it is not frozen in time. Rather, like any other
common law principle, the public trust doctrine adapts and evolves with
the changing needs of society. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained
that "we perceive the public trust doctrine not to be 'fixed or static,' but
one to 'be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs
of the public it was created to benefit.'
39
The courts recognized that waterways and their shores remain
economically and socially significant, although the specific uses change
over time. Subsistence and small-scale commercial fishing and navigation
were once as important to the economy of New Jersey as tourism and
recreational activities are today.4" Tourism is currently the second-largest
contributor to the New Jersey economy;4 indeed, the modern economic
equivalent of the fishing net may be the beach blanket.42 Current popular
37. Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 393 A.2d 579, 581-82 (N.J. 1978).
38. See Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
A New Jersey court also invalidated a municipal ordinance that prohibited wearing beach
apparel on a public street. See Hyland, 393 A.2d at 582.
39. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (quoting
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 47 (N.J. 1972)).
40. Nevertheless, commercial fishing in New Jersey remains significant. The New Jersey
Sea Grant program estimates that the industry contributed $600 million to the state economy in
1998. Gef Flimlin & Stewart Tweed, Commercial Fisheries, JERSEY SHORELINE, Mar. 2000, at
17, 17, available athttp://nsgl.gso.uri.edu/njmsc/njmscoOOOOl.pdf (last visited on June 11, 2007).
41. Kenneth McGill, Presentation, Global Insight, Inc., An Impressive 2005 for NJ
Tourism: The Tourism Satellite Account Perspective 11 (2006) (prepared for the N.J.
Commerce, Economic Growth & Tourism Commission), available at http://www.state.nj.us/
travel/pdf/2006-07-tourism-ecom-impact.pdf.
42. Public use has evolved from traditional activities such as fishing and navigation to
include a broad range of recreational activities, like swimming and sunbathing. Moreover,
recreational activities are now an important component of the economic, commercial, and social
life of the Jersey Shore (and along many other states' shores). Fishing and navigation are not
exhaustive of traditional public uses. See Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54 (holding that doctrine is
evolving and flexible). Almost one hundred years ago, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that
it would be too strict a doctrine to hold that the trust for the public, under which the
State holds and controls navigable tide waters and the land under them, beyond the
line of private ownership, is for navigation alone. It is wider in its scope, and it
includes all necessary and proper uses, in the interest of the public.
Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909); see also Fernandez,
supra note 15, at 628-29. For a further discussion of the evolution of the meaning of "public
use," see infra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
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coastal recreational activities include boating, fishing, swimming, surfing,
bird-watching, and tanning. Those who engage in these activities buy
gasoline, food, and beach-related equipment, and stay in hotels and rental
units, contributing significantly to the state's economy. 43 Tourism is also
the third-largest private sector employer in the state." The increase in
New Jersey's coastal population and development has outpaced the
already rapid rate of population growth and development statewide.
The proximity of the ocean and other tidal waterways are the
predominant reason for the enormous value of waterfront property.
In July of 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the
impact of these economic and social developments in New Jersey in the
context of applying the public trust doctrine to privately owned beaches
in Raleigh A venue Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.46 In order to
better understand the significance of the Raleigh A venue decision, one
must first be familiar with the foundational analysis provided in its
predecessor, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n.
1. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association
In Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed three issues
that have shaped the subsequent development of New Jersey's public
trust doctrine.47 First, the court recognized that the public has limited
rights to cross and use privately owned beaches. Second, the court
established that the uses of tidal waterways include recreational uses in
addition to the traditional fishing and navigation rights. Finally, the court
set forth a multi-factor balancing test for analyzing the scope of public
rights to a specific dry sand beach:
43. For example, the National Marine Fisheries Service has estimated that recreational
saltwater fishing generates hundreds of millions of dollars in expenditures, total economic
output, and earnings, and can produce over 16,000 jobs in a given year. See Eleanor Bochenek,
New Jersey's Marine Recreational Fisheries, JERSEY SHORELINE, Mar. 2000, at 19, 20, available
athttp://nsgl.gso.uri.edu/ njmsc/njmsco00001.pdf. In California, coastal tourism is estimated to be
the "largest 'ocean industry,"' contributing $9.9 billion to the California economy compared to
$6 billion for ports, $860 million for offshore oil and gas, and $550 million for fisheries and
mariculture combined." Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, Coastal Tourism and
Recreation: The Driver of Coastal Development, in TRENDS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR
U.S. NATIONAL OCEAN AND COASTAL POLICY 73, 73 (Biliana Cicin-Sain, R.W. Knecht & N.
Foster eds., 1995), available at http://www.oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/
natdia-pdfl12udel.pdf.
44. MCGILL, supra note 41, at 21. Total tourism to the state grew by 9.8 percent in 2005,
contributing $25.7 billion, or 5.9 percent of gross state product, including $15.2 billion in wages
and salaries, 472,000 jobs, and $7.1 billion, or 7.6 percent, of state tax revenue. Id. at 22, 25, 38.
45. New Jersey Smart Growth Gateway, Smart Growth Solutions,
http://www.smartgrowthgateway.org/local-envirintro.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
46. 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
47. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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Precisely what privately-owned upland sand area will be available and
required to satisfy the public's rights under the public trust doctrine
will depend on the circumstances. Location of the dry sand area in
relation to the foreshore, extent and availability of publicly-owned
upland sand area, nature and extent of the public demand, and usage
of the upland sand land by the owner are all factors to be weighed and
considered in fixing the contours of the usage of the upper sand.48
The beaches in dispute in Matthews were privaiely owned but
managed by a private association that provided services similar in type
and scale to those provided by Jersey Shore municipalities. The Bay
Head Improvement Association had about five thousand members, with
association staff serving as lifeguards, maintaining both the association's
and the borough's beaches, patrolling the beach, selling beach badges,
and controlling entrance to the beach. In addition, the association
maintained a close relationship with the Borough of Bay Head. The
purpose of the association was to provide residents of the borough with
beach access and use, and the borough supported the association through
cooperative municipal resolutions, free office space, tax-exempt real
estate, free liability insurance coverage, and public funding of beach
protection structures. The court found that the association was quasi-
public "[w]hen viewed in its totality-its purposes, relationship with the
municipality, communal characteristic, activities, and virtual monopoly
over the Bay Head beachfront."'4 9
Under Matthews, the public enjoys the right to traverse quasi-private
beach property if reasonably necessary for access to the foreshore and the
right to use some of the quasi-privately owned dry sand beach above the
high water mark (i.e., above the landward limit of state property). The
right to cross the beach includes the rights to cross from the nearest
waterward public road or path down to the water's edge ("perpendicular"
or "vertical" access) and the rights to cross along the water's edge
("lateral" or "horizontal" access). Perpendicular access involves the
public's ability to reach the beach and ocean, often by traversing privately
owned upland property. Lateral access includes the right to actually use
the dry sand and to walk along the beach parallel to the edge of the
ocean.5" The court explained the importance of perpendicular access in
Matthews
Without some means of access the public rights to use the foreshore
would be meaningless. To say that the public trust doctrine entitles
48. Id. at 365.
49. Id. at 368.
50. Id. at 365. These rights are analogous to the common law right to discharge or take on
passengers or cargo from an intertidal shore, to bring fish from the shore to the nearest road, or
to land a boat on the shore, unload the catch, and dry the nets. See Fernandez, supra note 15, at
628-29; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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the public to swim in the ocean and to use the foreshore in connection
therewith without assuring the public of a feasible access route would
seriously impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of the
public trust doctrine. 1
Under the balancing test set forth, the extent of required public
access across and use of quasi-private beach property depends upon four
factors: the location of the dry sand in relation to the foreshore; the
extent and availability of publicly owned upland dry sand area; the nature
and extent of the public demand; and the usage of the upland dry sand
area by the private owner.5
The Matthews decision repudiated the practice of affluent
oceanfront owners gradually adopting various methods to appropriate
sections of beach. Those appropriations included exclusive use of the
adjacent area of ocean and shore below the mean high water line. Since
those areas are publicly owned natural resources under New Jersey law,
such practices effectively employ state assets for exclusive private use, at
times even for profit-generating activities. Such practices often are self-
perpetuating: as word spreads, it becomes common knowledge which
beaches are open to the general public and which are restricted to
residents of that municipality, to owners of adjacent properties, or to
"members only." The conflict surrounds a difference in expectations: the
public assumes past unrestricted use means that the beaches are open for
access and use by all, while private persons who invested in oceanfront
land at a premium price yearn for coastal exclusivity.
2. Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.
Twenty-one years after Matthews, in a fact-sensitive decision, New
Jersey's highest court again addressed public access to and use of the
coast. In Raleigh A venue, the court held that the public trust doctrine
required that an entire beach owned by a private club, from the high tide
line to the dunes, must be open to the public for a reasonable fee to be
approved by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP) 3 The decision stated that allowable beach fees may cover only
the actual costs of basic beach services, including lifeguards, trash
removal, showers, toilets, and administrative costs.54 The court also held
51. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364.
52. Id. at 365. While the court recognized public rights to use privately owned beaches, the
decision focused on the quasi-public nature of the association that operated the beaches due to
its nexus with the municipality. Nevertheless, the beaches at issue in Matthews were privately
owned.
53. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
54. Id. at 118. In essence, the court approved a two-tier fee structure: one for members in
private facilities and one for the general public in the public area. The private club, Atlantis, may
charge whatever the market will bear for use of its private facilities, such as cabanas, umbrellas,
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that the area of privately owned dry sand was open to public access and
use based on the four Matthews factors. Unlike the quasi-public beach
association in Matthews, the Atlantis Beach Club was an entirely private
organization, independent of the municipal government. The court cited
the lack of a public beach in the municipality; a state permit issued to the
neighboring condominium project that required public access;55 high
demand from hundreds of residents immediately inland oi the beach; and
the longstanding prior free public use of the beach. 6
The dissent in Raleigh A venue stated that the public does not need
access to the beach area owned by Atlantis Beach Club because it can use
the adjacent beach owned by Seapointe Condominiums. However, the
dissenting opinion failed to recognize several important differences
between the two owners. While the owner of Seapointe retained title to
gazebos, etc., without regulation under the public trust doctrine. Such fees remain subject to
other government police power regulations, such as taxation, consumer protection, health and
safety laws, and regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages. However, Atlantis may not
appropriate public assets and use them as if they were the private assets of a for-profit entity.
55. Issued under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21
(2007).
56. Raleigh A venue, 879 A.2d at 121-24; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders of the U.S.
v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358-59 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that title to
riparian property under the public trust doctrine is subject to the public's right to use and enjoy
property, even if such property is alienated to the private owners through tidelands grants). The
public also has certain rights to inland waterways, as the U.S. Supreme Court has extended the
public trust doctrine to non-tidal waters that are navigable in fact. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 437 (1892).
Since "navigability in fact" is defined by state law, however, public rights to inland waterways
vary widely by state. In general, the public has the right to use a body of water if, in its natural
state, the public can navigate through the water body in a floating vessel. Public rights in the bed
of inland waterways are largely dependent upon the title owner of the submerged land.
In New Jersey, the state owns all surface and ground water, and holds it in trust for the use of the
people of the state. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. N.J. Water Supply Auth., 511 A.2d 1194,
1195-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1986) Moreover, public use of these waters is consistent with
the public trust doctrine absent some state regulatory reason to prohibit access to or use of a
particular water course (e.g., closing access to certain potable water reservoirs). All navigable
waters within New Jersey and the land beneath them belong to the state, and all members of the
community have rights of navigation in those waters. See Stevens v. Peterson & Newark R.R.
Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 549 (1870).
This right of navigation, together with the recognition by the Matthews court that the
public trust doctrine includes recreational uses, supports the fight to use a canoe or kayak on any
nontidal waterway in New Jersey that is navigable in fact. Recreational users of nontidal
waterways can benefit from a familiarity with the scope of public trust rights under the law of
their state, and an awareness of, and sensitivity to, the uses of those waterways and their shores
by private property owners. In areas where the rights of passage or portage are unclear, formal
or informal permission may be advisable, if not necessary. Some recreational groups have
obtained easements to formalize and secure the terms of such long-term use. A successful
example of this is the Northern Forest Canoe Trail, which follows mostly navigable rivers along
traditional Native American routes for 740 miles from Old Forge, New York to Fort Kent,
Maine, passing through the states of New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, and the
province of Quebec. See Northern Forest Canoe Trail, http://www.northernforestcanoetrail.org
(last visited May 23, 2007).
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both the beach and its property landward of the dune line, the
predecessors to Atlantis Beach Club had sold off their property landward
of the dune line and retained title only to the beach. The owner of
Seapointe included both the property landward of the dune line and the
beach in its development proposal, with the beach as an ancillary
improvement and service to the high-rise residential condominium
buildings on the lot to the west of the dune line. Unlike Seapointe, all of
Atlantis' structures, other than an unpermitted, illegal gate, were located
in the dune or beach area. Seapointe's owner also complied with state
regulations that require public access to the waterfront." When the
NJDEP issued a permit approving Seapointe's proposal to develop
certain beach and dune areas with amenities for the exclusive use of its
owners,58 it required Seapointe to leave the balance of its beach open for
public use, including a continuous area of dry sand beach above the mean
high water line along the entire length of the seaward side of its property.
The NJDEP also placed a limit on the fees that Seapointe could charge
the general public for use of that area. 9 Although Atlantis Beach Club
was subject to the same regulations, it had attempted to evade them by
conducting regulated activities without the required permits, which would
have included public access conditions. The appellate division and
supreme court, however, found that Atlantis was subject to and must
comply with those regulations.
B. New Jersey Public Trust Doctrine Regulations: Public Access to the
Waterfront and the Hudson Waterfront Walkway
Expanding on the common law holdings of Matthews, New Jersey
codified the scope of public rights to use tidal waterways and their shores
in two regulations: Public Access to the Waterfront and the Hudson
Waterfront Walkway. The NJDEP promulgated those regulations
through its Coastal Permit Program Rules and Coastal Management
Program (collectively, its Coastal Zone Management Plan,' adopted
under applicable federal and state statutes).6 These regulations require
expansive public access to waterfront areas.
57. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7E-8.11(b) (2006); see also infra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text.
58. Those amenities included a pool, cabanas, and tiki bars.
59. Recently, NJDEP approved Seapointe's application for a modest fee increase based on
increased costs of its beach operations.
60. N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 7:7, 7E.
61. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1456 (2006) (state program
provisions); Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 2006); id.
§ 12:5-3 (approval requirements for waterfront development).
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The Public Access to the Waterfront rule requires broadly defined
physical and visual public access to all waterfront areas "to the maximum
extent practicable."6
Coastal development adjacent to all coastal waters, including both
natural and developed waterfront areas, shall provide permanent
perpendicular and linear access to the waterfront to the maximum
extent practicable, including both visual and physical access.
Development that limits public access and the diversity of the
waterfront experiences is discouraged.63
Similarly, the Hudson Waterfront Walkway rule requires specific
measures for public access to and use of the west shore of the Hudson
River,' including a paved path thirty feet wide along the entire shore,
with paved perpendicular access paths at regular intervals.
The NJDEP published extensive amendments to the Public Access
to the Waterfront rule in the November 6, 2006 issue of the New Jersey
Register.' The amended regulation updates and clarifies the public rights
of access to and use of tidal waterways and their shores following the
Raleigh A venue decision. The proposed rule amendments expressly state
that the public has rights to use any tidal waterway and the shores of all
tidelands at any time and that the public is entitled to use any open space
land acquired, and any beach built or replenished, with public funds. The
rule also formalizes the standards for beach fees set forth in Raleigh
A venue.
The Hudson Waterfront Walkway rule met regulatory takings law
challenges in the judicial system, and there is a strong possibility that the
new Public Access to the Waterfront rule will face similar legal action.
The next section addresses the intersection of the public trust doctrine
and regulatory takings jurisprudence.
C The Public Trust Doctrine and Regulatory Takings Case Law
Further litigation of the public trust doctrine will likely involve
claims of a regulatory taking. Based on the case law discussed in the next
section, this Article posits that requiring public access to and use of the
shores of tidal waterways is not an unconstitutional taking of property
62. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7E-8.11(b).
63. Id.
64. The entire length of the Hudson River within New Jersey is tidal.
65. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders of the U.S. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 64 F.
Supp. 2d 354, 356 (D.N.J. 1999); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7E-3.48 (2006) (referring to
Hudson Waterfront Walkway Planning and Design Guidelines, prepared by Wallace Roberts &
Todd, Louis Berger & Associates, Inc. & Ralph Hirsh (1984), at 73 ("public access easement for
waterfront walkway must have a minimum right-of-way width of thirty feet") (guidelines on file
with authors)).
66. Proposed Repeal and New Rule: N.J.A.C. 7:7E-8.11, 38 N.J. Reg. 4570(a) (Nov. 6,
2006).
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since these public rights are a background principle of New Jersey state
law.67
1. New Jersey Public Trust Doctrine as a Defense to Regulatory
Taking Claims
In National Ass'n of Home Builders of the United States v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,6 the federal district
court in New Jersey upheld the Hudson Waterfront Walkway rule against
a challenge by a national trade association that claimed the regulation
constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking of private property
without just compensation. 69 The court noted that most of the property at
issue was formerly submerged land that had been reclaimed by artificial
filling and held that the Walkway rule is a valid exercise of the state's
police power to safeguard rights under the public trust doctrine.7" The
court found that the public trust doctrine is part of real property law in
New Jersey and that the doctrine protects the public rights at issue.
Because those public rights were never conveyed away by the Crown or
the state, the court found that they remain subject to public rights of use
and enjoyment that cannot be extinguished even with conveyance of title
to these tidal waterfront areas.7 National Ass'n of Home Builders is an
important recent application of U.S. Supreme Court case law, clarifying
that the public trust doctrine is a background common law principle in
New Jersey.
2. Relevant U.S. Supreme Court Case Law on Regulatory Takings
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that background principles of
state law are essential to determining whether an unconstitutional taking
67. For information on constitutional takings by regulation, see Michael C. Blumm &
Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy- The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical
Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005); Sean T. Morris, Note, Taking Stock in
the Public Trust Doctrine Can States Provide for Beach Access without Running Afoul of the
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence?, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 1015 (2003).
68. 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358-59 (D.N.J. 1999).
69. Id. at 359-60.
70. Id at 358, 359 n.2.
71. Contrary to the assertion of at least one commentator, NationalAss'n of Homebuilders
was not simply a regulatory takings case; the public trust doctrine also was essential to its
holding. See Stephanie Reckord, Limiting the Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine in New
Jersey A Way To Protect and Preserve the Rights of Private Ownership, 36 SETON HALL L.
REV. 249, 252 n.28 (2005). Since these public rights were never conveyed, they never entered the
chain of title to these properties and therefore could not be lost by their current owners. As the
New York Court of Appeals stated with regard to the navigation servitude: "[h]aving never
owned the easement, riparian owners cannot complain that this rule works a taking for public
use without compensation." Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192, 1196
(N.Y. 1998).
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claim has any validity. The property owner in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council challenged a state regulation that prohibited
construction in flood-prone dune areas." South Carolina promulgated the
rule after the owner purchased the property, in the midst of developed
lots, with the apparent expectation to develop it. The Lucas Court found
that a total deprivation of economically viable use of a property could be
a per se taking of property requiring compensation; however, the
claimant first must establish that the property interest of which it was
allegedly deprived was not prohibited by nuisance law or any other
background principle of state property law. For example, since the
NationalAss'n of Homebuilders court found that the public rights upheld
by the challenged state regulation were also protected by the public trust
doctrine-a background principle of state law-there was no
unconstitutional taking of property.
In an earlier case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,7 3 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a state's assertion of a public right is not an
unconstitutional taking or exaction if the right asserted is recognized
under the public trust doctrine of the law of that state.74 The Court held
that the owners of land in Mississippi that is subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide could not reasonably expect to hold title to those lands,
because Mississippi law consistently held that the public trust doctrine
extends to land under tidewater and that the public interest in these lands
includes both navigation and nonnavigation activities such as bathing,
swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral development. Accordingly,
the Court affirmed the Mississippi Supreme Court's holding that the
state's assertion of these public rights was not an unconstitutional
taking.75
The U.S. Supreme Court has found an unconstitutional taking in
other cases involving public access to tidal waterways; however, neither
of those cases involved a discussion of the public trust doctrine. In Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission,76 the Court found a taking where the
state agency required an access route across private property that would
provide public access to a beach, purportedly to protect the public view of
the ocean, as a condition for a permit to reconstruct the property owner's
home. The Court observed:
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement
across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in
order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning
72. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
73. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
74. Id. at 475.
75. Id. at 484.
76. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have
no doubt there would have been a taking.
77
However, the Court did not address two critical points: whether the
access route was required by the public trust doctrine under California
law and the extent of public access to this beach, if any, without this
access route.78
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,79 the Court found a regulatory
taking where the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers required public access to
a marina that was created from a pond dredged and excavated to connect
to a bay. The pond had been separated from the bay by a barrier beach.
The Court found that the pond had not been navigable in fact and did not
become available for public access simply by the owners' opening the
pond to the bay by their own construction activities. Most importantly,
the pond was located on property that was private under Hawaii law,'J as
opposed to the formerly tidally filled lands in National Ass'n of
Homebuilders that were subject to the public trust doctrine under New
Jersey law.
D. Confronting Criticisms of the New Jersey Public Trust Doctrine
Application of the public trust doctrine to establish the principle of
public access to New Jersey's coastline, particularly in light of the state
supreme court's decision in Raleigh Avenue, has not been without
criticism. 1 However, those commentators' arguments have overlooked
several material points of New Jersey law. First, assets protected by the
public trust doctrine, including tidal waterways and their shores, were
never conveyed into the chain of title to any private landowner in New
Jersey. Second, the state owns the ocean and, except for limited rights
conveyed to private entities in some areas by tidelands grants, it also
owns the submerged land up to the mean high water line. Third, the
public has a right to use at least some portion of dry sand above the mean
high water line. Finally, the public trust doctrine is a common law concept
that, like any other common law concept, is inherently flexible and
77. Id. at 831.
78. Had California supported its demand for the easement upon the public trust doctrine
and the necessity for physical access to the ocean, the condition might not have been deemed an
unconstitutional taking under the fact-specific test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See Morris, supra note 67, at 1038-39.
79. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
80. Id. at 165-66.
81. See, e.g., Reckord, supra note 71; Kristin A. Scaduto, Note, The Erosion of Private
Property Rights after Raleigh Ave. Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, 51 VILL. L. REV.
459 (2006).
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changes over time. This section addresses these and other common
misgivings about Raleigh A venue and the public trust doctrine.
1. Title and Landowner Expectations
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were well aware of the public
trust doctrine. It is not retroactive-it predates the Constitution and is
part of the common law. An expansive public trust doctrine always has
been part of New Jersey law. As early as 1821, in Arnold v. Mundy, the
New Jersey Supreme Court clearly understood the profound importance
of the freedoms guaranteed by the public trust doctrine.83 Few cases have
set forth the letter and spirit of what the public trust doctrine meant to
the early United States in more evocative language than Arnold v.
Mundy, as quoted verbatim at the beginning of this Article.84
Several commentators rely on Lucas and Nollan to allege that a
broad view of the public trust doctrine, such as that found in Raleigh
Avenue, adversely affects the investment-backed expectations of
oceanfront property owners.8 As the real estate market has risen over
the past ten years, some private property owners have become
increasingly aggressive about closing beaches adjacent to their upland
properties and appropriating the adjacent section of beach and ocean as if
it were their private property.
Private property owners have no legal right to appropriate any
public asset or right for exclusive private use. The public trust doctrine
preserves state-owned assets and public rights and precludes any
unreasonable expectations that such rights belong to private landowners.
An investment is a commitment of capital with some degree of risk in an
effort to gain a profitable return; the return often is proportionate to the
degree of risk.86 Prospective oceanfront property owners should know
that, as a matter of law, the courts protect public rights of access to and
use of the public resources adjacent to oceanfront private properties and
82. See. e.g., Scaduto, supra note 81 (failing to report all material facts of record, such as
the property owners' regulatory obligations under New Jersey law or litigation history of
riparian grant issue). The facts in Raleigh A venue were more involved than these authors have
suggested. When examined together, the history of title, the regulatory history of the parcel, and
the history of public use of the beach, as well as the Matthews factors, supported unrestricted
public access.
83. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
84. Id. at 92-93; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
85. E.g., Reckord, supra note 71, at 285-88; Scaduto, supra note 81, at 463, 494. For a
discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Raleigh A venue, see supra Section
III.A.2.
86. See. e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("One who buys with
knowledge of a [regulatory] restraint assumes the risk of economic loss. In such a case, the
owner presumably paid a discounted price for the property. Compensating him for a 'taking'
would confer a windfall.") (citations omitted).
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should incorporate this knowledge into any decision to purchase. The
investigation of legal encumbrances upon a property is part of standard
due diligence in real estate transactions.87 Therefore it is not reasonable
for private investors to justify the appropriation of public assets with
claims that they expected to be able to exclude the public from any beach
in New Jersey.8"
2. Balancing Public and Private Rights
Contrary to what one commentator alleges, 9 the New Jersey public
trust doctrine decisions, including Raleigh A venue, have balanced public
rights with private rights. Understanding Raleigh Avenue requires
recognizing that waterfront property owners such as the Atlantis Beach
Club receive the reciprocal benefit of unrestricted access to and use of
public assets, namely, the ocean and the wet sand beach up to the mean
high water line. Those public assets add much to the value and enjoyment
of the property and make it unique. The New Jersey courts have never
denied any private property owner the right to use assets protected by the
public trust doctrine, or required a private property owner to pay
damages to the public even for longstanding practices that denied the
exercise of public trust rights. In Raleigh A venue, Atlantis disturbed that
balance of public and private rights. Atlantis went far beyond its own
rights by charging its members for access to and use of a public resource,
while excluding all nonmembers.
Another commentator presumes incorrectly that landowners who
allow perpendicular access across their properties make themselves
vulnerable to added liability." In fact, a state statute limits property
owners' liability when they are required to provide public access.9'
Neither will Raleigh A venue lead to overuse of the beach under a
"tragedy of the commons" rationale.92 This has not been New Jersey's
experience. The most significant threat to beaches in New Jersey is not
their heavy use but the severe long-term erosion and destruction
87. See, e.g., Colleen E. Healy & Mark S. Hacker, Comment, The Importance of
Identifying and Allocating Environmental Liabilities in the Sale or Purchase of Assets, 10 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 91 (1999).
88. In his dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Justice Brennan, a former
New Jersey resident and longtime member of the New Jersey judiciary, noted the assumption by
the majority "that private landowners in this case possess a reasonable expectation regarding the
use of their land that the public has attempted to disrupt." He disagreed, concluding that "the
situation is precisely the reverse: it is private landowners who are the interlopers." 483 U.S. 825,
847 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Reckord, supra note 71.
90. Scaduto, supra note 81, at 492.
91. Landowner Liability Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-8, -8.1 (West 2006).
92. Scaduto, supra note 81, at 492-93.
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associated with major storm events. 3 Such events have already inflicted
damage that far exceeds the standard maintenance required by public use
of New Jersey's beaches. 4  Furthermore, the presumption that
privatization leads to greater protection of the commons is false in this
situation. In Raleigh A venue, the neighborhood plaintiffs alleged that the
exclusive private beach club, despite its very high fees, was poorly
maintained, and they submitted photographs that appeared to support
their claim. By contrast, even the free municipal beaches in New Jersey,
such as in the nearby Wildwoods, are clean and well maintained. Most
municipalities, like the Wildwoods, recognize that their beaches attract
the public to their businesses and rental properties, and increase their
property values and tax base. Accordingly, the dire predictions by some
commentators of overuse and deterioration simply have not come to pass.
. Application of Other Common Law Principles in Conjunction
with the Public Trust Doctrine
At least one commentator has recommended that states should use
the common law principles of dedication, prescription, and custom to
protect coastal access, rather than the public trust doctrine. 5 That author,
however, fails to acknowledge that the public trust doctrine is itself a
longstanding common law principle and that each of the alternative
common law principles she suggests has its own shortcomings and is
unlikely to adequately protect public rights. These other common law
theories may complement a claim under the public trust doctrine given
the requisite factual support. However, only the public trust doctrine can
provide a broadly applicable and long-term solution to public access
problems.' 6 The following subsections discuss these common law theories
93. See New Jersey Coastal Protection Technical Assistance Service, Stevens Institute of
Technology, The Establishment, Growth and Evolution of Coastal Dunes in New Jersey and Its
Relation to the Present Storm Protection Level Provided by the Dune Field in Ocean City, NJ,
Jan. 8, 2007 (on file with authors).
94. Shore protection projects that repair this damage are publicly funded by the state and
federal governments, with extensive requirements for public access to and use of all
reconstructed areas. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' guidance documents, for example,
require perpetual easements, public access and use, parking, restrooms, and handicapped access
ramps. For general information on New Jersey shore protection projects, see NJDEP Coastal
Engineering, Beach Nourishment, http://www.nj.gov/dep/shoreprotection/nourishment.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2007).
95. Scaduto, supra note 81, at 466-68.
96. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 360 (N.J. 1984).
While the court in Matthews did not decide whether common law doctrines such as necessity,
prescription, dedication, or custom can establish the public's right-of-way from the public streets
to the foreshore, it suggested that these principles were of limited utility: "We perceive no need
to attempt to apply notions of prescription, dedication, or custom as an alternative to application
of the public trust doctrine. Archaic judicial responses are not an answer to a modern social
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that, in an appropriate situation, can establish a public right of
perpendicular access to the shore.
1. Easement by Necessity
An implied easement by necessity generally arises by operation of
law where "an owner of land conveys to another an inner portion thereof,
which is entirely surrounded by lands owned by the conveyor. '9 7 Without
the easement, the landlocked parcel has virtually no utility to its owner,
who has no access to his land.9" Such an easement is predicated upon the
strong public policy that no land may be made inaccessible and useless, as
the conveyee is found to have a right-of-way across the conveyor's land
for ingress to, and egress from, the landlocked parcel.99
By refusing perpendicular public access, upland property owners can
create a barrier to the ocean, in effect appropriating a public asset to their
own exclusive use. In essence, a state-owned asset is not so much
landlocked as it is effectively "waterlocked" by the private barriers
between public streets and the ocean, held in trust for New Jersey citizens
yet inaccessible along many portions of the coast.
An easement of necessity arises only when there has been unity of
ownership and a subsequent severance of title resulting in the grantor or
grantee owning a landlocked, or in this case, waterlocked parcel."° The
state, the original conveyor of all private oceanfront lots, now finds itself
on the opposite side of that transaction-the private landowners have
transformed the state's property, the ocean, into the "inner portion,"
barricaded against public access or use by private lands. Those private
landowners may claim entitlement to retain this alleged benefit of an
arms-length conveyance.0 1 Such a blockade of the ocean likely violates a
number of New Jersey laws, regulations, and public policy, and a court
could find an implied right-of-way for public ingress and egress to the
ocean."0 ' In addition, the Atlantic Ocean is not, technically, a waterlocked
problem." Id. at 365 (citations omitted). Though these common law theories are broadly similar
across states, each is subject to individual state law.
97. Leach v. Anderl, 526 A.2d 1096, 1099 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (quoting 3
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 410, at 34-62 to 34-63 (1985 & Supp.
1987)).
98. See, e.g., Ghen v. Piasecki, 410 A.2d 708, 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
99. See Leach, 526 A.2d at 1099; Old Falls, Inc. v. Johnson, 212 A.2d 674, 680 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1965).
100. See Cale v. Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972); A.J. & J.O. Pilar,
Inc. v. Lister Corp., 119 A.2d 472, 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (declaring burden of
proof on easement claimant as clear and convincing evidence).
101. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 57 (N.J.
1972) (Francis, J. dissenting) ("In my judgment a private owner could legally fence in his entire
beach area upland of the mean high water mark, if he was moved to do so.").
102. But see id.
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parcel because there are some existing perpendicular access points
(although many of those are not preserved in perpetuity) whereby the
public could reach the upland, albeit in locations that are distant from
specific sections of ocean shore or inconvenient for some members of the
public.
Even if one could establish an easement by necessity, it would
establish fewer public rights than the public trust doctrine, since each has
a different goal: the easement by necessity is to prevent inutility of the
property, while the public trust doctrine is to ensure adequate public
access to and use of the ocean and its shore. Further, implied easements
by necessity would need to be litigated on a case-by-case basis and thus
can only account for access to small fragments of New Jersey's 128-mile
Atlantic coastline.
2. Easement by Prescription
The common law doctrine of prescription is similar to that of adverse
possession: an individual who continually uses private property for an
extended, uninterrupted period of time when that private property owner
has knowledge of such use can acquire a permanent private easement in
that area."3 A public prescription lies when there has been adverse,
uninterrupted use of a substantially identifiable pathway by a sufficient
portion of the public for a considerable amount of time, such that the
landowner has notice of such use and that a public easement has been
claimed." To interrupt such public use, a landowner must intentionally
103. See Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 387 (1867) (internal citations omitted) ("The
user must be adverse, and not by sufferance. It must be contrary to the interests of the owner,
and under a claim of right against the true owner, and by his acquiescence, he knowing of such
use, and not objecting thereto; and the user must be of such a nature as to afford an indication to
the owner that a right is claimed against him.").
104. There are significant differences between a public and a private prescriptive easement.
First, public prescription can only occur when both ends of the easement lie on publicly owned
property. Second, while a private prescriptive easement is limited to the person or persons who
continually used the land during the entire prescriptive period and is restricted to the scope of
that use by the claimant(s) during the prescriptive period, a public prescriptive easement can be
used by the public at large, including those who never used the pathway during the prescriptive
period, and the scope of the use is not nearly as limited because it is for general public use.
Third, a private landowner might have the ability to negotiate with the holders of a private
prescriptive easement, but such negotiations with the state as holder of a public prescriptive
easement are much less likely given the duty the state owes equally to all its citizens, creating a
more permanent encumbrance on the property. For this reason, courts often have placed a
greater burden on those claimants seeking to establish a public prescriptive easement, as
opposed to a private one, namely that the claimant must prove that the nature and extent of the
use has put the private landowner on notice that the right has been claimed by the general
public, and not merely by an individual or group of individuals. Some states do not recognize
public prescription, as one court has held that an "unorganized public" cannot garner rights for
the whole. See William A. Dossett, Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v.
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take some overt act in protest of the use, such as an action in ejectment."
In Stallone v. Schiavone-Bonomo Corp.,1  the appellate division set forth
the modern New Jersey test for public prescription: those passing and re-
passing over a piece of private land must use it at random in their
position as members of the general public."°7 In most states, including
New Jersey, this burden has only been met when the use is analogous to
that of a public road or street."
The utility of the doctrine of prescription to establish perpendicular
public access to the ocean is limited, for it applies only in locations where
the public has already had access for a substantial period of time. Further,
it encourages oceanfront landowners to restrict access in an affirmative
effort to interrupt adverse use by the public."° Another difficulty with
public prescription is the presumption of permissiveness, as courts are
reluctant to punish "good neighbors" who let the public cross over their
land. Public accessibility is often deemed "permissive" under the
assumption that landowners, by neither objecting to nor permitting the
Holden Beach Enterprises: Preserving Beach Access Through Public Prescription, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1289, 1291 n.22 (1992).
To establish the "substantially identifiable" prong, claimants must prove that members
of the general public follow a pathway sufficiently definite to allow a reasonable determination
of the claimed easement and to provide notice of said pathway to the landowner. See Cobb, 32
N.J.L. at 387-88; Dossett, supra, at 1292, 1309 (suggesting precedent of Concerned Citizens
makes it possible for public to acquire rights of recreational use by prescription). Dossett
contends that an argument for public prescription is aided by a landowner's prior consent to
maintenance by public authorities, though it is not essential for said easement to exist, and courts
have taken varied positions with respect to this contention. Id. at 1309. Such pathways are
distinguishable from an easement for general profitable activity such as fishing, hunting, or
hawking over a large, rather undefined area, as these activities are generally deemed permissive,
not adverse, absent some clear claim of right. See Cobb, 32 N.J.L. at 389.
105. See Ludwig v. Gosline, 465 A.2d 946,947 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
106. 246 A.2d 754 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
107. Id. at 756. In Stallone, the pivotal issue was whether or not the petitioner's decedent
was killed while on a public highway or a private road.
108. See Olsen v. Erie R.R. Co., 124 A. 367, 368 (N.J. 1924); Acken v. Campbell, 342 A.2d
209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974). The mere fact that the public is not excluded from a
pathway across private land is not enough to create a use by prescription. In Olsen, the court
affirmed a nonsuit against plaintiff whose decedent was killed while walking at a crossing built
by a certain company and used only by those doing business with that company. The Acken
court held that the particular crossing was private and not a public highway since a necessary
component of a prescriptive right is use "by the public of the neighborhood." Acken, 342 A.2d at
213. The court held that the use of a crossing, either by one individual, employees of the
company, or those having business with the company to which the crossing gives access, does not
constitute public use because their use was not indiscriminate nor in their capacity as members
of the general public, but because of their relationship to particular property owners or users. Id.
Four states, California, Florida, Oregon, and Texas, have specifically applied this doctrine to the
dry sand area adjacent to the oceanic coastline. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59
(Cal. 1970); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75-76 (Fla. 1974); State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (Or. 1969); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372, 377-78
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
109. See Dossett, supra note 104, at 1331 & n.267.
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public to traverse private land, have given the public approval to do so.110
Since the landowner may terminate a potential prescriptive easement by
intentionally obstructing it, the public has little ability to control the
preservation of public access with this doctrine.
3. Easement by Dedication
The common law doctrine of implied dedication arises when the
conduct of the parties manifests an intent on the part of a private
landowner to dedicate land to public use and affirmative acceptance by
the public of that dedication. This is distinguishable from a public
prescription in that it focuses on the intent of the landowner and the
public with respect to public uses of a private property, as opposed to the
focus in prescription upon the actions of the public on private property
and the degree to which those actions manifested an intent to claim a
property right that is adverse to the landowner's existing rights."' New
Jersey courts have defined the term "dedication" as "the permanent
devotion of private property to a use that concerns the public in its
municipal character."' 
12
Since, in the absence of a deed of grant or written or oral
declaration, dedication of private lands to public use is a factual question
of intent, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that courts must
determine the "acts or conduct of the dedicator" rather than any
presumed intentions."3 While the government entity assumes certain
responsibilities upon acceptance of the right of public use, a dedication is
complete and irrevocable as soon as the landowner voluntarily expresses
110. Id. at 326-27. In North Carolina, this strong presumption was somewhat dismissed by
Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Holden Beach Enterprises, 404
S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1991), which expanded the prescription doctrine. Nonetheless, the presumption
is still relatively prevalent. At least one commentator suggests that this presumption should be
dismissed in its entirety on the oceanfront, as these private landowners certainly know that the
public has great expectations to be able to access and use the beach and the ocean, and a
presumption of adverse use would foster the public policy of promoting these rights. Id. at 1326-
33.
111. See Velasco v. Goldman Builders, Inc., 225 A.2d 148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
112. Id. at 153 (quoting Black v. Cent. R.R. Co., 85 N.J.L. 197, 202 (1913)) ("An implied
dedication arises 'from conduct of the dedicator which falls short of an express statement of
intent to dedicate but which nevertheless manifests an intent to dedicate land to public use."'
(quoting Roger A. Cunningham & Saul Tischler, Dedication of Land in New Jersey, 15
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 384-85 (1961))).
113. Brookdale Park Homes, Inc. v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 280 A.2d 227, 232-35 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1971) (quoting Haven Homes v. Raritan Twp., 116 A.2d 25, 28 (1955)) (concluding
that plaintiff's predecessors in title voluntarily and unequivocally manifested their intention to
dedicate lot in question to public use as playground area, and that such dedication or offer may
be accepted or rejected by public authorities at any time in future); see also id at 233 ("The
dedication of private lands to public use is essentially a matter of intent. This has long been the
law in this State."); Wood v. Hurd, 34 N.J.L. 87 (1869).
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an intent to devote the land to public use.1 4 The government's ability to
accept the dedication continues indefinitely until such time as it rejects or
vacates the dedicated lands by official legislative action."
5
Easements by dedication are similar to implied easements by
necessity and prescriptive easements in that both landowner intent to
dedicate and public acceptance must be adjudicated on a case-by-case
basis. These requirements limit the utility of the doctrine to substantially
shape the scope of perpendicular public access along the New Jersey
coastline."6
4. Easement by Custom
The doctrine of custom holds that a customary use can have the
effect of law if operating since "time immemorial" without interruption
and as of right, as long as it is certain as to location and reasonable as to
use." 7 In New Jersey, rights acquired by the public as a result of
customary use must not be for profitable purposes and must be so widely
accepted that they are indistinguishable from the law itself."8 Both the
frequency of use and a finding that a wide array of persons exercised that
114. See Brookdale Park Homes, 280 A.2d at 232-35: Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Eng'g
Corp., 123 A.2d 511, 515 (N.J. 1956) (finding that selling of lands with reference to map upon
which lots and streets are delineated constitutes dedication of streets to public, which dedication
cannot be revoked except by consent of public entity); Coleman House, Inc. v. City of Asbury
Park, 19 A.2d 889, 891 (N.J. Ch. 1941).
115. See Brookdale Park Homes, 280 A.2d at 233 ("[T]here is presently no legal time limit
within which an acceptance must take place and that a municipal agency may quite frankly take
its time in deciding whether to accept or not."). Examples of acceptance have included an
attempt to vacate the dedication by local ordinance and a municipality's awareness that taxes
were not assessed on a particular piece of property. See id. at 234; Currie v. Mayor of Jersey
City, 124 A. 153, 154 (N.J. Ch. 1924).
116. But see Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal. 1970); Seaway Co. v. Attorney
Gen. of Tex., 375 S.W.2d 923, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Cunningham & Tischler, supra note
112.
117. "Custom is unwritten law established by common consent and uniform practice from
time immemorial, and is local, having respect to the inhabitants of a particular place or district."
Albright v. Cortright, 45 A. 634, 635 (N.J. 1900) (quoting 2 GREENLEAF'S EVIDENCE § 248
(1842-1853)). See United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772-73
(D.V.I. 1974), affl'd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 78 (Haw. 1968);
State exrel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (Or. 1969). Only a right of easement, as opposed
to a profit a prendre (e.g., for fishing, hunting, etc.), can be claimed by custom. See Cobb v.
Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 388-89 (1867) ("[T]he witnesses who fished in the pond testify that
they did so under a conviction of their right, yet no one claimed a right personal to himself, or
other than such as it was thought belonged to the public in general. This evidence tends merely
to establish a customary right, in all the inhabitants and frequenters in that locality, to fish in
these waters, if a right to fish could be established by proof of custom. But the right of fishing
being a profit a prendre in another's soil, as distinguished from an easement, cannot be claimed
by custom, but must be prescribed for in a que estate.").
118. See Albright, 45 A. at 635.
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specific use are common factors in a court's determination of a customary
use under New Jersey law." 9
The use of New Jersey's tidal shores since "time immemorial" has
been well documented, though the nature of use has changed over time.
2"
Native Americans inhabited the land at least as early as 11,000 years ago,
and relied on fishing for both food and barter. In the late 1400s, upon the
first arrival by European settlers via navigation of the ocean, the coast
became an arena for transportation and commerce.12 ' Today, in addition
to its continued commercial uses, New Jersey's coastline serves as an
annual summer tourist destination for residents of all corners of the most
densely populated state in the nation, as well as for visitors from Boston,
New York City, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and beyond.
Customary use has the potential to preserve easements for public
access to tidal waterways and their shores. Since it is a common law
principle, its application would arise from the facts of specific situations
which may vary as to their statewide applicability. To achieve broad
applicability, this longstanding customary use of the ocean and its
beaches could be memorialized in legislation requiring reasonable
perpendicular public access to the entire New Jersey coast. Such
legislation could also set standards for the locations of access routes.
Common law custom alone, however, is not likely to address the scope of
allowable uses along those shores. Other states have codified customary
use and the other aforementioned common law doctrines of this section,
along with the public trust doctrine. 2 2 The next Part addresses some of
119. See Murray v. Pannaci, 53 A. 595, 596 (N.J. Ch. 1902) (acknowledging doctrine of
custom in New Jersey, though holding that no local custom exists that confers right upon citizens
at large to take sand off beach that results in substantial injury to other property).
120. See. e.g., N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, History, http://www.state.nj.us/pinelands/reserve/hist/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
121. See James R. Lee, Trade and Environment Database Case Studies: Mammoths and
Ivory Trade, http://www.american.eduITED/mammoth.htm (last visited May 4, 2007) (citing
HUMAN IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT: ANCIENT ROOTS, CURRENT CHALLENGES 21 (Judith
E. Jacobsen & John Firor eds., 1992) and Richard Klein, The Impact of Early People on the
Environment: The Case of Large Mammal Extinctions, in HUMAN IMPACT ON THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 25-26).
122. Recognizing the drawback of case-by-case litigation under the doctrines of public
prescription and implied dedication, the Oregon Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of
customary use in ruling that the public holds an easement for general recreational and
commercial use over the dry sand on all beaches of the state. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,
462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). Soon after, the legislature memorialized that decision in a statute. OR.
REV. STAT. § 390.610 (2006). North Carolina followed Oregon's lead, as the state's Division of
Coastal Management has taken the position that although state ownership ends at the mean high
water line, the public has always enjoyed the right to use the full width and breadth of the state's
ocean beaches seaward of the dune line, under the common law theory of customary use since
time immemorial. North Carolina's beach ownership statute states, in part:
The public having made frequent, uninterrupted, and unobstructed use of the full
width and breadth of the ocean beaches of this State from time immemorial, this
section shall not be construed to impair the right of the people to the customary free
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the recent measures taken in various coastal states across the country in
the name of the public trust.
IV. A SAMPLING: CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC ACCESS CASE LAW
FROM A VARIETY OF COASTAL STATES
While New Jersey has been at the forefront of the evolution of
modern public access rights under the public trust doctrine and additional
common law principles, numerous other states are in the midst of
addressing these important issues along our nation's shores. This Part
summarizes a small sampling of current public access issues on a variety
of coastal landscapes, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and from the
Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico.
A. North Carolina: Recent Decisions Discuss Public Rights to
Dry Sand Beach and Access Road
In an October 2005 order, a state appeals court of North Carolina
upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit, on sovereign immunity grounds, by a
group of Currituck County property owners who claimed the public has
no rights to the area of dry sand beach between the high water mark and
the vegetation line. 123 Although the title to this land lies with the private
oceanfront homeowners, it has long been the position of the state that the
area seaward of the beach vegetation line remains open to access and use
by the public under the public trust doctrine. 124 As the ruling was
procedural and did not address broader questions of state and private
property rights in the contested beach terrain, these issues are certain to
reach the North Carolina judicial system again soon.
125
use and enjoyment of the ocean beaches, which rights remain reserved to the people
of this State under the common law and are a part of the common heritage of the
State ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2006).
123. Fabrikant v. Currituck County, 621 S.E.2d 19, 29-38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); see also
Stephanie Showalter, Nat'l Sea Grant Law Ctr., North Carolina Court Affirms Dismissal of
Challenge to Public Access Rights, http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/National/SandBar/
4.4northcarolina.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20; North Carolina ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825,
828 (N.C. 1988); Joseph J. Kalo, The Changing Face of the Shoreline: Public and Private Rights
to the Natural and Nourished Dry Sand Beaches ofNorth Carolina, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1869, 1879
n.46 (2000); Christopher City, Private Title, Public Use: Property Rights in North Carolina's
Dry-Sand Beach (2001) (unpublished Master's Project, University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill), available at http://dcm2.enr.state.nc.us/Facts/dry-sand.pdf; N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural
Res., Div. of Coastal Mgmt., Who Owns the Beach?, http://dcm2.enr.state.nc.us/Facts/
beachown.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) (explaining North Carolina's longstanding policy of
maintaining accessible and usable beaches).
125. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs' claims were
barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine, which precludes suits against a state government
without its consent, thereby rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that sovereign immunity was
waived by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1. This provision allows actions against the state to quiet title
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Another public access battle in Currituck County may move before
the state's supreme court. A community association filed suit contending
that two roads leading to the beach should be public, contrary to the
county commissioners' decision to close the roads, allegedly upon public
safety grounds."2 6 A jury verdict reversed the commissioners' decision,
and North Carolina's appellate division recently affirmed.' 7 Currituck
County has joined with the county commissioners' association and a
homeowners' association in seeking review by the state's high court.128
B. Oregon: Statute Preserves Dry Sand Beaches of the Pacific Ocean
for Public Use, but Shores of Inland Waterways are in Jeopardy
Under Oregon statutory and common law, the public has the right to
use the entire dry sand beach along the state's 362 miles of oceanic
coastline.129 Although Oregon maintains a public easement on dry sand
beaches under the statute, a case-by-case analysis is necessary to establish
perpendicular access to these beaches under common law principles. In
an effort to accumulate permanent perpendicular public access points,
the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development has
adopted "Statewide Planning Goal 17-Coastal Shorelands," which
requires that public lands, rights-of-way, and easements that provide
when the state and an individual "asserts a claim of title to the [same] land." The court found
this provision inapplicable because none of the defendants had asserted a "claim of title to land."
See Fabrikant, 621 S.E.2d at 28 ("a 'claim of title to land' requires more than just an interest in
real property" asserted under public trust doctrine). To the contrary, North Carolina has
acknowledged that oceanfront property owners may hold title seaward to the mean high water
line; its position is that the public must have access regardless of title. See supra text
accompanying notes 123-124.
126. See Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. Currituck County Bd. of Comm'rs, 630 S.E.2d 714
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming reversal of the commissioners' decision to close roads to public
access and use), appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed, 641 S.E.2d 302 (N.C. 2007).
127. Id. In deciding to close the roads to the public, the commissioners claimed that the lack
of parking forces public beach patrons to park on the side of the road, which could impact fire
personnel access. See Jeffrey S. Hampton, Roads Dispute Taken to High Court, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Aug. 8, 2006, at Y1. At trial, the commissioners focused on safety issues
accompanying the fact that there is only one entrance to and exit from the beach on the street.
Witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the street must be public to allow safe access to and from
the beach and ocean. The jury determined that closing the roads to the general public was
contrary to the public interest. Ocean Hill, 630 S.E.2d at 717.
128. See Hampton, supra note 127.
129. OR. REV. STAT. § 390.610 (2006) (declaring state policy of preserving and maintaining
state sovereignty over ocean shore, and declaring in public interest preservation of said shore for
recreational use); State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (Or. 1969) (finding public
rights to entire ocean shore based on custom). Similarly, under Hawaii's Coastal Zone
Management Program, the public owns all beaches in Hawaii. See Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652
P.2d 1130, 1135 (Haw. 1982) (detailing purpose of coastal zone management program as one to
increase public access to oceanfront).
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physical or visual access to coastal waters not be sold unless some public
access or potential for access across the property is retained.130
While Oregon law has preserved public rights of access to and use of
its beaches of the Pacific Ocean, access to the state's inland rivers, creeks,
and streams has been under recent attack from private landowners.1 3' In
August of 2005, the Oregon legislature declined to enact Senate Bill
1028,132 which proposed the institution of a new user fee system including
regulations with respect to time, manner, place, and extent of uses. This
system would have severely reduced the public's right to use these
waterways for river travel and recreation.13  In addition, the Oregon State
Attorney General's Office issued an opinion explaining that even if a
waterway is not a "highway of navigation and commerce" under the
federal definition of "navigability,"'34 and is thus privately owned, the
waterway is still navigable for public use if boats can proceed
unimpeded.
135
C Michigan: Public Rights to Walk the Shores of the Great Lakes
In July of 2005, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the public
may walk along the Great Lakes shoreline in the corridor closest to the
water below the mean high water line, against opposition from
beachfront owners' claims that they own all of the land to the water and
could, if they chose, erect a barrier to public access and use.'36 The U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari, preserving the rights of all citizens to
walk along the beaches of Michigan's 3,200 miles of coastline regardless
of who owns the land adjacent to the water.
137
The Michigan Supreme Court found that "walking the lakeshore
below the ordinary high water mark . . . is inherent in the exercise of
traditionally protected public rights.' 3 Despite generally positive and
widespread media attention from citizen and environmental
130. See Or. Dep't of Land Conservation & Dev., Statewide Planning Goals,
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
131. See Russell Sadler, This Is Our Land, BLUEOREGON, May 22, 2005,
http://www.blueoregon.com/2005/05/newcomers to-or.html.
132. S.B. 1028, 73rd Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/O5reg/measures/sblOOO.dir/sbIO28.intro.html.
133. See Thomas O'Keefe, Am. Whitewater, Public Right to Navigability Upheld (OR),
Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.americanwhitewater.org/content/Article/view/articleid/1400/display/
full/.
134. For a discussion of the federal definition of "navigability," see supra notes 6 & 56.
135. See Or. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8281 (Apr. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.doj .state.or.us/releases/pdf/op-8281.pdf.
136. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 78 (Mich. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1340
(2006) (concluding that public may walk below mean high water line, as private title to
defendant's littoral property is subject to public trust).
137. 126 S. Ct. 1340.
138. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 74.
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organizations,139 this case arguably only maintained the status quo under
the public trust doctrine-that is, riparian lands are impressed with the
public trust, so the public can walk on the dry and wet sand shore."4 " The
Michigan Supreme Court's decision did not address perpendicular public
access or what activities, other than walking, might be permitted along
the shoreline. However, it did refer in dicta to a "right of passage," which
could be interpreted as a right of access to trust lands over private
properties. 4 ' Further, the justices qualified the holding by stating that
beach walking remains "subject to regulation."'4 2 In addition, the
beachfront property owners have expressed their intentions to file a
takings lawsuit for an alleged diminution of their property rights without
just compensation.143 Clearly, the battle over public rights of access to and
use of the Great Lakes in Michigan will continue in the years to come.
D. Texas.: Open Beaches Act Maintains Public Rights to the
State's Beaches on the Gulf of Mexico
Like North Carolina, Oregon, and New Jersey, Texas recognizes
public rights to both wet and dry sand beaches. Texas' Open Beaches
Act, adopted in 1959, preserves the public's rights of free access to, and
unrestricted use of, all Gulf Coast beaches in the state seaward of the
mean high water line and along those areas of dry sand in which the
public has acquired a common law right.144 Under the Act, beachfront
139. See. e.g., Editorial, Supreme Court's Inactions Saves Lakeshore Access, JOURNAL
TIMES.COM (Racine, Wis.), Feb. 22, 2006, http://journaltimes.cornarticles/2006/02/24/
opinion/iq_3919440.txt; Editorial, Walk a Beach: Thanks to US. Supreme Court, Sensible Rule
Stands, FREEP.COM (DETROIT FREE PRESS), Feb. 23, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 3121320;
John Flesher, Justices A void Beach Fight: Supreme Court Decides Not to Consider Michigan
Access Ruling, SOUTHBENDTRIBUNE.COM, Feb. 23, 2006, www.southbendtribune.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060223/NewsOl/602230429/CAT=NewsO1 (praising decision
allowing horizontal public access along Great Lakes shoreline).
140. See Flesher, supra note 139.
141. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 74 ("[O]ther courts have recognized a 'right of passage' as
protected with their public trust.); see also Town of Orange v. Resnick, 109 A. 864, 865 (Conn.
1920) (listing as public rights "fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish, gathering
seaweed, cutting sedge and ... passing and repassing"); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821)
(reserving to public use of waters for "purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing,
fowling, [and] sustenance").
142. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 73 (Mich. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1340
(2006).
143. See Flesher, supra note 139.
144. The Open Beaches Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.011- .026 (Vernon 2006),
declares a "public policy of this state that the public, individually and collectively, shall have the
free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the state-owned beaches bordering
on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico, or if the public has acquired a right of use or
easement to or over such area by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of
continued right in the public, the public shall have the free and unrestricted right of ingress and
egress to the larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation
bordering on the Gulf of Mexico." Id. § 61.011(a).
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properties can become subject to public access and use by virtue of a
landward-migrating vegetation line.
145
The Act makes it an offense for anyone to obstruct the way of
ingress and egress or the use of the beaches. The state and coastal
municipalities share the responsibility of protecting and enforcing these
public rights. Attorneys general of the state, counties, and districts, as
well as criminal district attorneys, all have authority to bring suits on
behalf of the people of Texas, and it is their duty to do so and to require
removal of any obstructions that may interfere with such public rights.'46
Further, cities and counties along the coast must adopt laws to protect the
public accessibility of beaches.'47
Recently, the Open Beaches Act has been assailed by developers
and private beachfront homeowners seeking to protect an alleged private
property right of exclusivity to the beaches. In the summer of 2006, a
plaintiff backed by the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a federal action
against government officials charged with enforcing the Act, claiming
that the enforcement of the legislation unconstitutionally deprives
beachfront property owners of their private property rights without just
compensation."4 Prior to the suit, government officials determined that,
due in part to the effects of flooding associated with Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita in 2005, certain private homes that were formerly landward of
the coastal vegetation line, but now sit seaward of the line, are potentially
subject to removal under the Act.'49 This determination followed the
state's recent lifting of a two-year moratorium on enforcement of the
Open Beaches Act. The moratorium sought to allow beachfront property
owners to make repairs to their homes and give natural weather and tidal
conditions the opportunity to move the line of vegetation back from the
homes. The plaintiff claimed that beachfront homeowners have a
fundamental constitutional right to exclude the public from their
property, while the state contended that the property is permanently
within the public trust lands identified under state statute. 50 On motion, a
145. Id.
146. See Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 375 S.W.2d 923, 925-26 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
147. See TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.015 ("Each local government with ordinance
authority over construction adjacent to public beaches and each county that contains any area of
public beach within its boundaries shall adopt a plan for preserving and enhancing access to and
use of public beaches within the jurisdiction of the local government.").
148. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for Violation of
Federal Constitutional Rights, Severance v. Patterson, 2007 WL 1296218 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2007)
(No. H-06-2467), 2006 WL 2515704.
149. See id.; Arrington v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 38 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 2001) (affirming
concept of floating easement where public beach has been established under common law
principles).
150. Defendants' Joint Rule 12(b)(1),(6) Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support,
Severance, 2007 WL 1296218 (No. H-06-2467), 2006 WL 3099390.
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federal district court recently dismissed the complaint, holding that the
common law migrating easement is constitutional and finding plaintiff's
constitutional challenges to Texas' enforcement of the easement
unripe51
V. THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: IDENTIFYING PROSPECTIVE
ISSUES SURROUNDING PUBLIC ACCESS TO AND USE OF NEW JERSEY'S SHORE
Following the Raleigh A venue decision in the summer of 2005, New
Jersey has employed a variety of strategies to protect the public trust
doctrine. This Part surveys these efforts and concludes with a brief
sampling of some of the major public trust doctrine issues that could soon
arise in New Jersey.
A. Ongoing Steps in New Jersey to Further Public Access To and Use
of the Atlantic Ocean and the Adjacent Dry Sand Beach
In addition to unrestricted use of the ocean, wet sand, and all of the
dry sand, waterfront property owners also receive the benefit of public
funds. Most, if not all, coastal states expend significant taxpayer dollars
each year to preserve and enhance natural resources protected by the
public trust doctrine. In New Jersey, this includes replenishing beaches;
building jetties, groins, and seawalls; building, operating, and maintaining
sewage treatment plants; building and maintaining roads, potable water,
and other expensive infrastructure in coastal areas; controlling nonpoint
sources of water pollution; monitoring ocean water quality; enforcing
laws prohibiting dumping from ships and barges; regulating and
enhancing the habitats of fish, migratory birds, and other wildlife; and
numerous other activities that enhance the value and enjoyment of tidal
waterways, their shores, and the adjoining public and private properties.
The NJDEP, Attorney General's Office, and Public Advocate are
each taking action to uphold the state's obligation to protect these
resources and ensure public access to and use of them. These actions
include litigation, amended regulations, regulatory oversight,
investigation, and proposed legislation, some of which is summarized
below. These state agencies must constantly remind waterfront property
owners that they must share with nonresident taxpayers the reciprocal
benefits and burdens of the public's rights to tidal waterways and their
shores. As Justice Brennan opined in his dissent in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, it is not reasonable for beachfront property owners
to expect that they will be able to exclude the public from crossing their
property for access to public trust areas.152 It is, after all, the resources
151. Severance, 2007 WL 1296218, at *7-9.
152. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 847 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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protected by the public trust doctrine, i.e., the ocean and its shoreline,
that provide so much of the value to the privately owned property. As
one commentator explained in the context of regulatory taking analysis
under the public trust doctrine, "Each person burdened by a harm-
prevention regulation is also reciprocally benefited because similarly
situated neighbors are also burdened. The lesson for coastal regulation is
obvious: coastal landowners may be burdened by reasonable public
access exactions; nevertheless, they are reciprocally benefited, both as
individual landowners and as beneficiaries of the jus publicum."' 53
The ocean is a public resource that provides benefits to all, including
free use. No one may take for their exclusive private use any public asset
or right protected by the public trust doctrine. Any barrier that denies
members of the public their rights of access to and use of public trust
property also creates an enclave in which the private property owner
claims to have exclusive use of public assets. These public assets include
the ocean and its submerged lands up to the mean high water line and the
right of the public to use a reasonable area of dry sand above the mean
high water line. Arguably the public trust doctrine has increased the
value of real estate and coastal development in New Jersey by allowing
everyone to walk along and use the entire beach and ocean, irrespective
of ownership, not just the small portion an individual happens to own. An
important goal of the state's activities is to prevent the private
appropriation of these public assets.
1. Private Beach Clubs in the Borough of Sea Bright, Monmouth
County, New Jersey
In 1993, the state of New Jersey, the Borough of Sea Bright, and
each of the nine private beach clubs in Sea Bright signed identical three-
party agreements ("Original Agreements") for a publicly funded beach
nourishment and replenishment project. This beach project runs from
Sandy Hook to Barnegat Inlet (about forty miles), is for a fifty-year
period, and is estimated to cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The Sea
Bright portion of the project is approximately four miles long and will
cost well over $40 million in public funds over the life of the project, of
which at least $29.4 million has been spent since 1995. The nourishment
and replenishment of the Sea Bright portion expanded the beach lying
seaward of the beach clubs from a narrow strip of dry sand to a dry sand
beach extending 250 feet above the mean high water line.
153. Gilbert L. Finnell Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property. Judicial Issues and the
Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 679 (1989); see also Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-
Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine on Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537,
564 (1994) (arguing that those who purchase property adjacent to public trust lands do so "with,
at least, constructive knowledge of the state's interpretation of the public trust doctrine").
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The Original Agreements allow only very limited public access to
and use of the new beach, which lies partly on the property of each of the
beach clubs and of the Borough of Sea Bright. Additionally, the public
may only walk along a fifteen-foot-wide strip of dry sand along the
water's edge in front of the beach clubs, or fish during non-swimming
hours. Under the Original Agreements, the public has no right to stop,
sit, or rest on the beach, or to swim, at any point on any of the properties
of the beach clubs.
In a complaint filed on September 22, 2006 by the Attorney General
and the NJDEP, New Jersey seeks a declaration and reformation of the
parties' and the public's rights pursuant to the Original Agreements. The
state relies upon legal decisions subsequent to the signing of the
agreements that clarify public rights to tidal waterways and their shores in
New Jersey. 54 The state contends that the Original Agreements
incorporated the public trust doctrine into their terms and that the courts
have clarified the public trust doctrine since the signing of the agreements
in 1993.155
2. Enforcement Action: Ocean Beach and Bay Club III, Dover
Township, Ocean County, New Jersey
In August of 2005, the NJDEP fined Ocean Beach and Bay Club III
of Dover Township $12,500 for refusing to allow public access to the
beach area adjacent to its property. Under a Coastal Area Facility
Review Act Permit issued by the NJDEP, the club is required to allow
public access to the beach, subject to a reasonable fee to be used solely
for basic beach operating expenses such as lifeguards, trash removal, and
bathroom facilities.1
56
More than a quarter of the beaches along the 128-mile New Jersey
oceanic coastline are still controlled by private owners, many of whom
continue to resist public access. As discussed above in the context of the
Sea Bright litigation, some of those resisting owners have benefited from
multi-million dollar, publicly funded projects that substantially restored
severely eroded beaches. While more enforcement efforts are needed to
154. Complaint, Rabner v. D. Lobi Enters., Inc., No. MON-C-296-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. filed Sept. 22, 2006). Those decisions include National Ass'n of Homebuilders of the United
States v. New Jersey Department of En vironmental Protection, 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999),
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005), and City of
Long Branch v. Liu, 833 A.2d 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003) (holding that a publicly
funded replenished beach, at least in the absence of a state tidelands conveyance, did not belong
to beachfront property owners because the "new beach" resulted from avulsion, not accretion).
155. Complaint, supra note 154.
156. The NJDEP takes steps to minimize the environmental impacts of public access
pathways, for example, by prohibiting access across coastal dunes, strictly regulating beach
driving, protecting fertile nesting sites, and installing signage at designated access ways.
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re-open these beaches to the public, the resources to enforce these public
rights are finite.
3. Acquisition and Green Acres Program
NJDEP's Green Acres program purchases available lands for
preservation as part of the state's system of park, forest, wildlife
management, and naturally preserved areas. In September of 2005, for
example, Green Acres and Ocean Township agreed to purchase nine
acres in Waretown, preserving one thousand feet of publicly accessible
waterfront area on Barnegat Bay.157
B. Anticipated Future Public Trust Doctrine Issues in New Jersey
This Article argues that continued litigation over perpendicular and
lateral access to New Jersey's beaches, as well as clarification of the
modem definition of "public use," will arise in the near future.
1. Issues for Potential Judicial Determination
It is difficult to predict how many lawsuits will occur as a result of the
Raleigh A venue decision, though issues remain in several categories.
Some property owners want substantial payments from the state for
shore protection projects, which may lead to litigation to obtain
easements for project construction and perpetual public access.15 8
Applicants receiving permits containing public access conditions may file
administrative appeals of these conditions. In addition, when owners
should have applied for permits but failed to do so, they are likely to face
enforcement actions. Moreover, regulated activities for which the NJDEP
issued a permit but neglected to include public access conditions may lead
to litigation regarding the state's duty as trustee. Further, courts could
also be employed to address properties on which there is no regulated
activity but there is inadequate public access or use availability. Finally,
157. The state of Florida has a similar program. See Florida Preservation 2000 Act, FLA.
STAT. § 259.101 (2006).
158. There are at least two ongoing lawsuits involving these issues in New Jersey. See
Petrozzi v. Ocean City, No. CPM-L-218-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. filed May 2, 2005); New
Jersey v. Ginaldi, No. C-264-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Nov. 14, 2006). Global warming
also affects the calculus of publicly funded hazard mitigation and protection projects; rising sea
levels and more frequent and violent storms will cause more coastal erosion and damage leading
to increased demands for protection and further deterioration of recreational beaches available
for human use. Factors related to climate change and shore protective measures have imposed
economic and environmental costs while sharpening the competition for public access to and use
of finite, threatened coastal resources that are beyond the scope of this Article.
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the state may face an appellate division challenge to its recently updated
regulations that require public access to the waterfront. 159
2. What Will "Public Use" Mean in the Future?
During the reign of King John in England, public use in the context
of the public trust doctrine meant that people could walk the shores, fish,
or gather shellfish as the tide rolled out.' 60 However, some of these
seemingly obvious and non-intrusive uses are often restricted along New
Jersey's shore. In the past, "use" involved landing one's boat, drying
one's nets, and traveling to the nearest road to bring the catch to market.
Public use of New Jersey's ocean and beaches has evolved-but does it
just mean the public can put down a blanket and lie on the sand? Today,
people certainly cannot land their boats at will, and are unlikely to be
allowed to freely dry their nets. What about eating on the beach? Or
running? Or playing ball? Or fishing? What about swimming,
bodyboarding, kayaking, or surfing? 161 A sign in the Borough of Deal,
New Jersey says: "Unprotected Beach: No Swimming/Bathing, Alcohol
or Pets," despite the fact that the Borough considers this beach accessible
for public use. In addition, as of the fall of 2006, there is only two-hour
parking with limited spaces on the street and dangerous concrete and
garbage on the way down the stair-less hill to the dry sand.6 2 Another
sign, in Ocean City, New Jersey, states: "Beach Tags Required ...
Persons Not Permitted on Beaches 10 p.m. to 6 a.m .... No Bicycles on
Boardwalk 12 noon to 5 a.m .... Prohibited on Beach or Boardwalk:
Dogs, Picnicking, Alcoholic Beverages, Open Fires, Loud Music, Ball
Throwing, and Skateboards. Ordinance 87-17." Private oceanfront
landowners in oceanfront towns like Deal and Ocean City fear that an
expansion of the definition of "public use" will lead to more cars and
crowds in their now-exclusive neighborhoods. 63 These current limitations
159. See Proposed Repeal and New Law: N.J.A.C. 7:7E-8.11 and Proposed New Rules:
N.J.A.C. 7:7E-3.50 and 8A, 38 N.J. Reg. 4570(a) (Nov. 6, 2006) (Public Trust Rights Rule and
Lands and Waters Subject to Public Trust Rights).
160. See supra notes 2, 49 & 57 and accompanying text.
161. For example, several courts have upheld local ordinances prohibiting or restricting
surfing against free speech, freedom of expression, equal protection, and due process challenges.
See MacDonald v. Newsome, 437 F. Supp. 796 (E.D.N.C. 1977); State v. Zetterberg, 244 A.2d
188 (N.H. 1968); People v. McGuire, 313 N.Y.S.2d 56 (N.Y. Long Beach City Ct. 1970). But see
Carter v. Town of Palm Beach, 237 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1970) (holding that complete prohibition on
surfing at all Palm Beach beach areas was unreasonable).
162. See Alexander Lane, In Deal An All-Too-Public Quarrel, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Sept. 2, 2006, at 1.
163. Id. (citing resident complaints of loud music, crowds of cars, and surfers changing into
their wetsuits). Indeed, the complaints of the waterfront owners in the Glass case in Michigan
apparently went far beyond simply public strolling along the lakefront. Private landowners along
Michigan's shoreline have indicated they have had to chase people away who were riding on
horseback and all-terrain vehicles, and fear that the government will now control all that goes on
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in some towns beg a new question: what is the value of perpendicular
public access to New Jersey's coastline, for which this Article advocates,
if the public cannot enjoy themselves when they get there?
in the lakefront area that is flowed by the tide. See Flesher, supra note 139. Similar complaints
regarding the fear of government control over all waterfront activities have arisen in New Jersey,
though none have been substantiated to date. For a discussion of the more substantial fear of
damage and erosion associated with coastal storms, and New Jersey's efforts to protect against
these effects, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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